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Abstract
The ability to interpret and follow the gaze of our social partners is an integral skill in human communication. Recent research has
demonstrated that gaze following behaviour is influenced by theory of mind (ToM) processes. However, it has yet to be
determined whether the modulation of gaze cueing by ToM is affected by individual differences, such as autistic traits. The
aim of this experiment was to establish whether autistic traits in neurotypical populations affect the mediation of gaze cueing by
ToM processes. This study used a gaze cueing paradigm within a change detection task. Participants’ perception of a gaze cue
was manipulated such that they only believed the cue to be able to ‘see’ in one condition. The results revealed that participants in
the Low Autistic Traits group were significantly influenced by the mental state of the gaze cue and were more accurate on valid
trials when they believed the cue could ‘see’. By contrast, participants in the High Autistic Traits group were also more accurate
on valid trials, but this was not influenced by the mental state of the gaze cue. This study therefore provides evidence that autistic
traits influence the extent to which mental state attributions modulate social attention in neurotypical adults.
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Attending to the gaze direction of others is a fundamental
building block of human communication and social cognition.
For neurotypical individuals, the mere perception of another
person’s gaze direction is sufficient to drive a shift in attention
(Driver et al., 1999; Ristic & Kingstone, 2005), and recent
research has demonstrated that this attentional shift is likely
modulated by theory of mind processes (Gobel & Giesbrecht,
2020; Morgan et al., 2018). However, autistic individuals of-
ten show difficulties with theory of mind processes (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001), atypical attentional responses to eye-gaze
direction (Freeth & Bugembe, 2019; Freeth et al., 2010), and
somewhat reduced accuracy in making line-of-sight judge-
ments (Freeth et al., 2020; Pantelis & Kennedy, 2017).
Individuals within the neurotypical population can also dem-
onstrate traits associated with the Broad Autism Phenotype
(Hurley et al., 2007), and there has been some recent sugges-
tion that autistic traits influence gaze cueing task performance
involving emotion processing (de Araújo et al., 2021).
However, it is yet to be determined whether autistic traits
influence the extent to which mental state attributions mediate
gaze cueing in neurotypical individuals.
Neurotypical individuals display a remarkably clear preference
to attend to the eyes in a face, starting within their first 24 hours of
life (Farroni et al., 2002) and continuing into adulthood (Levy
et al., 2013). The early preference to attend to the eyes develops
into an ability to follow gaze direction by 3 months of age, and an
ability to orient our attention to the end location of a gaze cue by 12
months of age (Dalmaso et al., 2020). The ability to follow a gaze
cue is argued to be an essential skill in allowing us to follow and
engage in social interactions, with the gaze direction of our social
partners acting as a signal to important events and objects within
our environment (Capozzi & Ristic, 2018). Indeed, the influence
of a social partner’s gaze direction on our own attention is clearly
demonstrated via the gaze cueing effect (Driver et al., 1999). In
typical gaze cueing paradigms, a participant demonstrates signifi-
cantly faster reaction times to detect a target when the location of
the target is validly indicated by the eye direction of a stimulus face
(Driver et al., 1999; Ristic & Kingstone, 2005). The gaze cueing
effect is a robust phenomenon that occurs rapidly in response to
viewing the eye movements of another person, and its existence
has been demonstrated consistently throughout the period inwhich
it has been studied. Therefore, the gaze of others has been proven
to be important not only in terms of its social relevance but also in
terms of its ability to orient our attention to key information within
our environment (Dalmaso et al., 2020).
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However, the processes underlying gaze cueing are strong-
ly contested. Gaze cueing is often argued to be a reflexive
process which occurs rapidly and outside of the influence of
conscious, top-down processing (Cole et al., 2017; Cole et al.,
2015). Yet, in contrast to this claim, several studies have provid-
ed key evidence that gaze cueing can be guided by top-down
attributions, even at time latencies associated with bottom-up,
spontaneous processing (Dalmaso et al., 2014; Gobel &
Giesbrecht, 2020; Morgan et al., 2018). Gaze cueing has been
proven to be guided by the top-down influence of relevant social
information—for example, the social status, emotional valance,
or age of our social partner (Dalmaso, et al., 2020; Gobel &
Giesbrecht, 2020). However, of key consideration to this study,
it is argued that our beliefs regarding the mental states of our
social partners also play a crucial role in influencing the extent
to which we follow their gaze (Baker et al., 2016; Furlanetto
et al., 2016; Morgan et al., 2018; Teufel et al., 2010). Indeed,
in a recent study, we replicated previous research (Nuku &
Bekkering, 2008; Teufel et al., 2010) demonstrating that partic-
ipants showed significantly reduced gaze cueing effects if they
believed a social partner to be unable to physically ‘see’ a target
(Morgan et al., 2018). This therefore suggests that whilst gaze
cueing may occur rapidly and automatically, it is still open to
influence by top-down processing, such as when we attribute
mental states to our social partners.
Autism Spectrum Conditions (ASC) are characterized by dif-
ficulties in social communication and social interactions across
multiple contexts, including deficits in nonverbal behaviours
such as eye contact (DSM-5; America Psychiatric Association,
2013). Of key interest, as a spectrum condition, individuals with-
in the neurotypical population can also demonstrate traits associ-
ated with the Broad Autistic Phenotype. Such individuals may
display characteristics associated with a diagnosis of an ASC,
and yet remain below the clinical cut-off for diagnosis (Hurley
et al., 2007). Autistic individuals show consistent differences to
neurotypical individuals in their attention to the eye region of a
face, with autistic individuals demonstrating a stronger prefer-
ence to attend to the mouth rather than the eyes (Hanley et al.,
2015). Leading from this, research has suggested that autistic
individuals may not show a gaze cueing effect (Riby et al.,
2013; Wykowska et al., 2015), and other research suggests that
higher levels of autistics traits in neurotypical individuals can
lead to reduced gaze cueing effects (Alwall et al., 2010; Bayliss
& Tipper, 2005; Lin et al., 2020). Further, autistic individuals
have also been found to consistently experience difficulties with
theory mind processing and difficulties with assigning mental
states to their social partners (Abell et al., 2000). Likewise,
neurotypical individuals with high levels of autistic traits also
perform significantly worse on perspective taking and theory of
mind tasks than participants with low levels of autistic traits
(Gökçen et al., 2014; Gökçen et al., 2016; Lockwood et al.,
2013). However, despite this research, and the high prevalence
of autistic traits within the general population, to date there is still
little understanding of the relevance of autistic traits to the impact
of theory of mind processes on the gaze cueing effect.
The aim of the current study was therefore to investigate
the impact of autistic traits on the mediation of the gaze cueing
effect by mental state attributions. The current study was a
replication of our previous study, which investigated the in-
fluence of mental state attributions on the gaze cueing effect in
neurotypical adults (Morgan et al., 2018); however, in this
study, whether individuals were high or low in autistic traits
was considered as an additional factor. The study used a
change detection paradigm within a gaze cueing task; partic-
ipants were presented with an array of four symbols and a
centrally presented face. The face was wearing either yellow
or red sunglasses, and participants were informed that one of
these colours indicated that the agent was unable to ‘see’
through the lenses of the sunglasses. Participants were asked
to complete the change detection paradigm and indicate if one
of the four symbols had changed between an initial presenta-
tion and a subsequent presentation. The face could either val-
idly cue the location of the change (gaze at the symbol that
would change) or invalidly cue the location of the change
(gaze to another location). Two stimulus onset asynchronies
(SOAs) were used; a short SOA associated with reflexive
processing and a longer SOA associated with top-down pro-
cessing. The study found that participants demonstrated a gaze
cueing effect, and that this effect was modulated by the mental
state attribution of ‘seeing’ at both the short and long SOA,
with participants following the gaze cue more when they be-
lieved it to be able to ‘see’. In the current study all participants
completed a measure of autistic traits and were consequently
divided into two groups based on their total scores. In line
with previous studies, individuals were assigned to a group
via a median-split; those who scored above the median were
assigned to the High Autistic Traits group, and those who
scored below the median were assigned to the Low Autistic
Traits group (Alink & Charest, 2020; O’Keefe & Lindell,
2013; Vabalas & Freeth, 2016). Based on previous research
indicating that the presence of autistic traits can lead to diffi-
culties with theory of mind abilities (Gökçen et al., 2014;
Gökçen et al., 2016; Lockwood et al., 2013) we predicted that
for the participants with high amounts of autistic traits, the
gaze cueing effect would not be influenced by the mental state
of a gaze cue agent. Conversely, for the participants with low
amounts of autistic traits we predict that the gaze cueing effect
will be influenced by the mental state of a gaze cue agent.
Materials and methods
Participants
An a priori power analysis revealed that on the basis of the
effect size observed in the original study (Morgan et al., 2018;
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f = 0.18), a minimum of 31 participants would be needed in
each group in order to detect a significant effect of α = 0.05
with statistical power to detect such an effect with 80% prob-
ability. Seventy-five participants (52 female and 17 male),
with a mean age of 19.65 years (range: 18–29 years, SD =
2.40) were recruited via opportunity sampling from an under-
graduate cohort, receiving course credit for taking part. The
study was approved by the Department of Psychology Ethics
Committee, and all participants gave informed consent before
participating. All participants had normal, or corrected-to-nor-
mal, vision. Additionally, all participants completed the Broad
Autism Phenotype Questionnaire (BAPQ), a self-report ques-
tionnaire designed to measure the number of autistic traits
present in a neurotypical population. Nine participants had a
high rate of reporting false positives on the catch trials and
were excluded from the final analysis, leaving a final sample
of 66 participants. Based on a median split (med = 94) of
participants’ total scores on the BAPQ, participants were di-
vided into two groups: those high in autistic traits and those
low in autistic traits (see Table 1).
Design
The study used a mixed-model design with four independent
variables: condition (seeing or nonseeing), validity (valid or
invalid), group (low or high autistic traits) and stimulus
onset asynchrony (SOA; 230 ms or 1,080 ms). The use
of two SOAs allowed a measure of early processing and
later top-down effects. The experimental trials were ran-
domized across condition, validity, and SOA. The study
paradigm was a change detection task, which required
participants to correctly identify whether one of four
symbols (displayed in each corner of the screen) had
changed. The study was preregistered on the Open
Science Framework (osf.io/cxyq4).
Materials and apparatus
The study used the same change detection task as used by
Morgan et al. (2018). In this paradigm, participants viewed
photographs of an actor wearing a pair of either red or yellow
sunglasses. Participants were informed that the actor was only
able to see whilst wearing one of the pairs of sunglasses, with
the colour of the ‘seeing’ sunglasses counterbalanced between
participants. The gaze cue agent was centrally presented and
appeared to gaze at one of four probe stimuli presented in the
four corners of the screen (see Fig. 1). Each photograph used
the same actor, and the stimuli for each condition differed only
on the colour of the sunglasses used. The probe stimuli could
be either E, U, O, P, S, F, H, L, or A and measured 1.8 × 1.8
cm. The probe stimuli appeared 5 cm away from the initial
fixation point.
All participants also completed the Broad Autism
Phenotype Questionnaire (BAPQ). This 36-item question-
naire was chosen for use as it is designed to be sensitive to
the broader autism phenotypes present within neurotypical
populations (Hurley et al., 2007). The BAPQ has demonstrat-
ed a high sensitivity (>70%) to detecting these phenotypes,
and therefore was suitable for use in this study as a measure of
the number of autistic traits present in the neurotypical partic-
ipants who took part in the study.
Procedure
Prior to commencing the main part of the study, all partici-
pants first completed the BAPQ. The procedure for the main
experiment followed the procedure used in Morgan et al.
(2018). Each participant first completed 10 practice trials, on
which they were required to achieve 50% accuracy to progress
to the main experiment. If participants did not meet 50% ac-
curacy on their first attempt they were able to retake the prac-
tice trials twice more. During the main experiment, each par-
ticipant completed three blocks of 80 trials, completing 240
trials in total. The study had 20% valid trials, 60% invalid
trials, and 20% catch trials, in which no change occurred. As
there were four potential stimulus locations, a 4:1 ratio of valid
to invalid trials was necessary to ensure that the gaze cue was
nonpredictive of change location.
Prior to starting the main experiment participants were
shown two brief videos, each approximately 15 s in length
(https://osf.io/hydfc/). The videos were designed to instil the
concept that the actor could ‘see’ whilst wearing one of the
pairs of coloured sunglasses and could not ‘see’ whilst
wearing the other. It was emphasized that the direction in
which the actor faced was nonpredictive and would not
indicate where the change would occur.
Trials began with the onset of a fixation point, which was
present for 1,000 ms. This was replaced with the stimulus
array containing four letters, each placed in one of the four
Table 1 Participant characteristics
High Autistic Traits Low Autistic Traits









Note. BAPQ = Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire. ** denotes sig-
nificant between group difference, p < .001.
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corners of the screen for 500 ms. The cue was present for
either 150 ms or 1,000 ms. The display was then masked for
80 ms, after which the screen refreshed to a new display of the
stimulus head and four symbols (see Fig. 1).
The participant was then required to press either ‘B’ or ‘N’
on their computer keyboard to indicate whether any of the four
symbols had changed. The participant pressed ‘B’ if they be-
lieved one of the symbols had changed, and ‘N’ if they be-
lieved none had changed.
Results
A 2 × 2 × 2 x 2 mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA),
with three within-subject factors of condition (seeing/
nonseeing), SOA (short/long), and validity (valid/invalid),
and one between-subjects factor of group (high autistic
traits/low autistic traits) on the probability of correctly identi-
fying a change revealed a main effect of validity, F(1, 64) =
13.71, p < .001, ηρ2 = .18, as the proportion of correct re-
sponses was greater for the valid trials, and a main effect of
SOA, F(1, 64) = 75.61, p < .001, ηρ2 = 0.54, as the proportion
of correct responses for was greater for the long SOA.
Critically, there was a significant Validity × Condition ×
Group interaction, F(1, 64) = 6.98, p = .010, ηρ2 = .10, and
there was also a significant Condition × SOA × Group inter-
action, F(1, 64) = 5.06, p = .028, ηρ2 = .07, indicating that
group membership had an impact on task performance, the
nature of which is explored in the following two sections.
There was no Condition × SOA × Validity × Group interac-
tion, F(1, 64) = 1.35, p = .249, ηρ2 = .02, and no SOA ×
Validity × Condition interaction, F(1, 64) = 0.41, p = .523,
ηρ2 = .01, indicating that the nature of the Validity ×
Condition interaction did not differ between the Long and
Short SOA. This demonstrates that SOA did not influence
the extent to which the gaze cueing effect was mediated by
the mental state attribution.
Mental state attributions: ANOVA
In order to investigate the critical Validity × Condition x
Group interaction, two separate 2 × 2 repeated-measures
ANOVAs were conducted, one for the High Autistic Traits
group and one for the Low Autistic Traits groups. The analy-
sis revealed that both the LowAutistic Traits group,F(1, 33) =
5.14, p = .030, ηρ2 = .14, and High Autistic Traits group, F(1,
33) = 9.57, p = .004, ηρ2 = .24, had a significant main effect of
validity; both groups were more accurate on the valid trials
(High TraitsM = .80; Low TraitsM = .77) , than on the invalid
trials (High TraitsM = .76; Low TraitsM = .73) and therefore
both groups showed a gaze cueing effect.
However, while the Low Autistic Traits group showed a
significant Condition × Validity interaction, F(1, 33) = 4.62, p
= .039, ηρ2 = .12, the High Autistic Traits group did not show
the same interaction, F(1, 31) = 2.51, p = .123, ηρ2 = .08.
Bonferroni-corrected post hoc paired-samples t tests therefore
investigated the interaction present in the Low Autistic Traits
group. The analysis revealed that participants demonstrated a
gaze cueing effect in the seeing condition and were signifi-
cantly more likely to detect a change in the seeing condition
when the cue was valid (M = 0.79, SD = 0.13), compared to
when the cue was invalid (M = 0.72, SD = 0.17), t(33) = 2.72,
p = .010. By contrast, in the nonseeing condition the same
participants did not display this cueing effect and there was
no significant difference between the valid (M = 0.74, SD =
0.19) and invalid trials (M = 0.74, SD = 0.19), t(33) = 0.25, p =
Fixaon point for 1000ms
Smulus array for 500ms
Gaze cue for either 150 or 1000ms
Smuli masked for 80ms
Smuli reappear: one of the 
symbols may or may not have 
changed
Fig. 1 The experimental procedure. Trial types were randomized based on validity, condition, and stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA). The figure
illustrates a valid trial
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.807. These results demonstrate that participants in the Low
Autistic Traits group only were influenced by the mental state
of the cue-agent as when the cue-agent could see, validly cued
targets were more likely to be detected than invalidly cued
targets. However, when the cue-agent could not see, validly
cued targets were no more likely to be detected than invalidly
cued targets (see Fig. 2).
Mental state attributions: Regression
Further exploratory analyses were conducted to assess wheth-
er treating autistic traits as a continuous, rather than dichoto-
mous, variable would also lead to the conclusion that the gaze
cueing effect in those higher in autistic traits was less influ-
enced by the mental state of the cue-agent.
Two difference scores were calculated by subtracting the
invalid-seeing trials from the valid-seeing trials, and the
invalid-nonseeing trials from the valid-nonseeing trials.
These scores reflected the strength of the gaze cueing effect
for each participant in the seeing and nonseeing conditions.
For the seeing condition, the regression analysis was not sig-
nificant, with participants’ total score on the BAPQ account-
ing for 0% of the variance in the gaze cueing effect in the
Seeing condition, F(1, 64) = .03, p = .867. This demonstrates
that in the seeing condition, the gaze cueing effect was not
affected by the number of autistic traits each participant
possessed.
By contrast, in the nonseeing condition Pearson’s correla-
tions indicated a significant positive relationship between par-
ticipants’ total score on the BAPQ and the strength of the gaze
cueing effect on nonseeing trials (r = .34, p = .006). A linear
regression confirmed that there was a significant relationship
between BAPQ scores and the gaze cueing effect in the
nonseeing condition; BAPQ scores accounted for 11.2% of
the variance in the gaze cueing effect in the nonseeing condi-
tion, F(1, 64) = 8.07, p = .006. Therefore, higher amounts of
autistic traits were associated with stronger gaze cueing effects
in the nonseeing condition, this confirms that individuals with
higher amounts of autistic traits were less influenced by the
mental state of the cue-agent and showed a gaze cueing effect
regardless of whether the cue-agent could see the target. This
analysis therefore replicates the results of the ANOVA analy-
sis and confirms that autistic traits influence the extent to
which mental state attributions affect the gaze cueing effect.
Stimulus onset asynchrony
The 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 mixed-model ANOVA revealed a signifi-
cant Condition × SOA × Group interaction. To further inves-
tigate this interaction, two separate 2 × 2 repeated-measures
ANOVAs were conducted for the High and Low Autistic
Traits groups. The analysis revealed that both the Low
Autistic Traits group, F(1, 33) = 35.82, p < .001, ηρ2 = .52,
and High Autistic Traits group, F(1, 33) = 9.57, p = .004, ηρ2
= .24, had a significant main effect of SOA; both groups were
more accurate at the Long SOA (Low Traits M = .80; High
Traits M = .83) compared to the Short SOA (Low Traits M
=.70; High Traits M = .73; see Fig. 3).
For the Low Autistic Traits group there was also a margin-
ally significant Condition × SOA interaction, F(1, 33) = 4.13,
p = .050, ηρ2 = .11, whilst the High Autistic Traits group did
not show the same interaction,F(1, 31) = 1.35, p = .255, ηρ2 =
.04. Bonferroni corrected post hoc paired-samples t tests re-
vealed that in the Seeing condition, the Low Autistic Traits
group were significantly more likely to detect a change at the
Long SOA (M = .79, SD = .14) compared with the Short SOA
(M = .71, SD = .14), t(33) = 4.24, p < .001. Further, this result
was replicated in the nonseeing condition with participants
being significantly more likely to detect a change at the
Long SOA (M = .80, SD = .19) compared to the Short SOA
(M = .68, SD = .19), t(33) = 6.00, p < .001. Finally, paired-
samples t tests revealed that at the Long SOA there was no
significant difference in accuracy between the seeing condi-






























Fig. 2 The probability of correctly identifying a change on the valid and invalid trials in the Seeing and Nonseeing conditions for the LowAutistic Traits
group (a) and the High Autistic Traits group (b). Error bars show ±1 within-subject standard error of the mean (SEM)
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= .19), t(33) = .31, p =.755. This result was replicated at the
Short SOA with no difference in accuracy between the seeing
condition (M = .71, SD = .14) compared with the nonseeing
condition (M = .68, SD = .19), t(33) = 1.60, p = .119.
These analyses confirmed that all participants were more
accurate, and therefore more able to detect if a change had
occurred, at the long SOA. However, they also revealed that
SOA did not influence the extent to which MSA affected the
ability of the participant to detect a change. Further, although
all participants were more accurate at the Long SOA this did
not influence the Validity × Condition interaction present in
the Low Autistic Traits group. Therefore, the mental state
attribution influenced the gaze cueing effect at SOAs associ-
ated with both bottom-up and top-down processing for indi-
viduals with low amounts of autistic traits.
Discussion
The aim of the current study was to investigate whether autis-
tic traits affect the extent to which mental state attributions can
influence gaze cueing in neurotypical individuals. The results
of this study very clearly demonstrate that autistic traits do
influence whether mental states affect gaze cueing. Whilst
both the High Autistic Traits group and the Low Autistic
Traits group showed a robust gaze cueing effect, only the
Low Autistic Traits group was influenced by the mental state
of the cue-agent and showed a significantly reduced gaze cue-
ing effect when they believed that the cue-agent was unable to
see the target it was gazing towards. This effect was not ob-
served in the High Autistic Traits group. Further, the mental
state attribution was found to influence the gaze cueing effect
for the Low Autistic Traits group at both the Long and Short
SOA. This demonstrates that mental states, and theory ofmind
processes, not only influence our attentional processing in a
top-downmanner (as demonstrated at the Long SOA), but that
these processes can also occur rapidly and automatically (as
demonstrated at the Short SOA). This was observed only for
participants in the Low Autistic Traits group. The results of
this study are therefore three-fold: (1) mental state attributions
canmodulate gaze cueing; (2) individuals high in autistic traits
do not use mental state information when processing gaze
cues, but individuals low in autistic traits do; and (3) mental
state attributions affect gaze cueing via both automatic atten-
tion cueing at short SOAs and conscious attention cueing at
longer SOAs in individuals low in autistic traits.
The findings of this study therefore support the study hy-
pothesis that autistic traits would affect the extent to which
mental state attributions influence gaze cueing. Interestingly,
both groups demonstrated a clear gaze cueing effect, and so
both groups were clearly capable of following the gaze of
another person. However, it is apparent that within our every-
day lives we do not indiscriminately follow every eye move-
ment to which we bear witness, thereby suggesting that we
must engage some form of top-down processing to determine
when it is most relevant to follow a gaze. In the case of this
study via the attribution of a mental state. This study demon-
strates that high amounts of autistic traits can lead to difficul-
ties in attributing mental states to our social partners, which
then leads to differences in gaze cueing behaviour in compar-
ison to individuals with low amounts of autistic traits. The
gaze of our social partners can act as a signal to important
events and objects within our environment (Capozzi &
Ristic, 2018). Therefore, if individuals do not have access to
all of the nuanced information used to determine either when
to follow a gaze or whose gaze to follow, then this has clear
implications for how their attention is directed in the world
around them. For those individuals in the High Autistic Traits
group, the inability to automatically attribute a mental
state to the gaze cue agent, and consequently discern
when it was most appropriate to follow the gaze cue,
therefore has clear implications for gaze following be-
haviour within their everyday lives.
Critically, the results of this study also support previous
studies which have found that reflexive attentional orienting
























Fig. 3 The probability of correctly identifying a change at the Long and Short SOA in the Seeing and Nonseeing conditions for the Low Autistic Traits
group (a) and the High Autistic Traits group (b). Error bars show ±1 within-subject standard error of the mean (SEM)
Atten Percept Psychophys
2016; Furlanetto et al., 2016; Morgan et al., 2018). Whilst
studies have suggested that mental state attributions do not
always directly guide gaze cueing (Gobel et al., 2018;
Kingstone et al., 2019). Nevertheless, the findings of this
study contrast with recent research, which argues that the pro-
cesses underlying reflexive gaze following are isolated from
the influence of theory of mind or perspective taking process-
es (Millett et al., 2019; Cole & Millett, 2019). These studies
draw their conclusions from experiments demonstrating that
participants can show perspective taking effects even in the
absence of a social partner (Wilson et al., 2017), or fail to take
into account an obstacle blocking a partner’s view and re-
spond as if the partner is able to ‘see’ through the barrier (as
in line-of-sight barrier tasks; Cole et al., 2015). However, in
contrast to these studies, our results replicated those found
within our previous paper (Morgan et al., 2018) and clearly
demonstrate that mental state attributions, and therefore theory
of mind processes, influenced the extent to which individuals
with low amounts of autistic traits followed the gaze of a
social partner. Further, in line with the parameters outlined
by Kuhn et al. (2018), the results of this study indicate that
this mediation occurred automatically, as the attribution of the
mental state transpired rapidly at an SOA associated with
bottom-up reflexive processing and, secondly, the mediation
occurred independently of any task goals. The participants in
this experiment were directly informed that the gaze was
nonpredictive and would not assist them with completion of
the secondary change detection task. This study therefore
demonstrates that not only domental state attributionsmediate
gaze cueing but also that they can do so automatically.
These findings could potentially be due in part to the nature
of the paradigm used in this study. Change detection tasks are
more sensitive to behavioural changes (Santee & Egeth, 1982)
and less susceptible to noise (Milliken & Tipper, 1998) than
response time tasks. Further, these types of tasks are highly
contingent on attention, such that participants are significantly
more accurate at identifying changes that occur at a cued lo-
cation (Smith & Schenk, 2008, 2010), which gave us the best
possible chance of observing modulations of cueing that may
not have been evident in reaction time tasks. Further, the ma-
nipulation used in this study was not only conveyed to partic-
ipants via written instructions but was also reinforced through
the use of videos. The videos allowed the participants to de-
velop a further association between the colour of the sun-
glasses and the seeing or nonseeing condition. The use of
these videos also encouraged the activation of theory of mind
processes; recent research has indicated that even simply
viewing another person engaging in an interaction (such as
between the experimenter and cue-agent during the object
identification task in the videos) is sufficient to generate
changes associated with theory of mind processes at both a
behavioural and cortical level (Gregory et al., 2015; Redcay&
Schilbach, 2019). Priming the engagement of theory of mind
processes prior to the beginning of the study may therefore
have supported the rapid attribution of mental states to the
cue-agent during the study.
Another consideration for the procedure of this study relates to
the location of the manipulation that generated the mental state
attribution. As discussed in our previous paper (Morgan et al.,
2018), in this paradigm the mental state attribution is generated
by directly manipulating the cue-agent, rather than the environ-
ment the cue-agent is situated in. This therefore allows the infor-
mation about the gaze direction and the mental state of the cue-
agent to be processed within the same spatial location, potentially
facilitating the rapid processing, and combining, of these two dif-
fering pieces of information. This contrasts to other variations of
perspective taking paradigms—for example, line-of-sight tasks—
that instigate a mental state attribution by introducing a ‘barrier’
between the cue-agent and the target. In such instances the mental
state manipulation is presented within the periphery of the partic-
ipant’s attention, rather than aligning with the centrally presented
cue-agent. The participant then must attend to and combine two
spatially distinct pieces of information. This arguably leads to
longer processing times as it adds an extra level of complexity to
the paradigm (Wilson et al., 2017), which would not lend itself to
the time courses associated with reflexive processing.
Conclusion
The aim of this study was to investigate the impact of autistic
traits on the mediation of the gaze cueing effect by mental
state attributions, and whether these attributions would influ-
ence attentional orienting within a change detection task. In
accordance with our previous findings, there was clear evi-
dence that mental state attributions influenced whether a gaze
cue was followed as participants were only likely to follow the
gaze direction of a cue-agent if they believed the agent was
able to see. However, critically, this effect was observed in the
LowAutistic Traits group only. No evidence of this effect was
observed in the HighAutistic Traits group, the perceived men-
tal state of the cue agent did not influence gaze cueing.
Crucially, this result was found to extend beyond top-down
processing at the long SOA and also influenced reflexive gaze
cueing at the short SOA. These results are critical as they
therefore demonstrate that autistic traits influence how mental
state attributions modulate gaze following behaviour.
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